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Atlantic Marine and the Future of Party
Preference
SCOTT DODSON*
In Atlantic Marine, the Supreme Court held that a prelitigation forum-selection
agreement does not make an otherwise proper venue improper. Prominent civil
procedure scholars have questioned the wisdom and accuracy of this holding. In this
paper, I defend Atlantic Marine as essentially correct based on what I have elsewhere
called the principle of party subordinance. I go further, however, to argue that the
principle underlying Atlantic Marine could affect the widespread private market for
prelitigation agreements, with significant commercial and doctrinal repercussions.
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* Professor of Law and Harry & Lillian Hastings Research Chair, University of California
Hastings College of the Law. I presented an early version of this paper at the civil procedure
roundtable during the annual meeting of the Southeastern Association of Law Schools. Many thanks
to those who commented on drafts.
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INTRODUCTION
Federal "venue" law prescribes which federal courts are proper to
hear a particular civil lawsuit. What if parties want to select their own
venue? Federal venue law allows challenges to improper venue to be
waived or forfeited by the parties, meaning that if the parties wish to
have their dispute litigated in an improper forum, then the procedural
rules allow them to do so. If, for example, the venue statute prescribes
only the Southern District of Texas and the Northern District of Texas as
proper for a particular case, the parties can nevertheless have their case
heard in the Eastern District of Texas if the plaintiff files there and the
defendant forfeits or waives its challenge to improper venue.
But what if the parties wish to restrict the range of lawful venues? In
other words, what if the parties wish to restrict venue only to the
Southern District of Texas, even though the law would allow the suit to
proceed in the Northern District of Texas? In that case, the parties would
typically codify their preference in a private contract specifying the sole
venue for their dispute as the Southern District of Texas. Such restrictive
forum-selection provisions are quite common in many contracts.'
The lingering question is how a court should, if at all, enforce such
law-altering private agreements. If the plaintiff, having agreed to the
restrictive forum-selection clause, nevertheless sues the defendant in the
I. 14D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE § 3803.1 (4th ed. 2013)
("Contractual provisions purporting to govern where a suit may be brought are common.... Now they
are nearly ubiquitous in all manner of contracts .... ); see also id. at n.i (citing cases); David Marcus,
The Perils of Contract Procedure: A Revised History of Forum Selection Clauses in the Federal Courts,
82 TUL. L. REV. 973, 975 (2008) ("The forum selection clause ... is among the most important and
pervasive types of contract procedure.").
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Northern District of Texas, should the court dismiss the case? Transfer
the case to the Southern District? Do nothing? Under what authority
and under what standards?
The Supreme Court answered these questions in Atlantic Marine
Construction Co. v. U.S. District Court.2 It held that a restrictive forum-
selection clause may be enforced by a court at the insistence of the
defendant not by dismissal or transfer for improper venue, but rather
under the federal venue statute that allows transfer from one proper
venue to another proper venue for the convenience of the parties and
witnesses and in the interests of justice.'
In the immediate wake of the decision, some questioned the
accuracy and wisdom of the Court's holding, and a prominent scholar's
brief urging dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)-rather than transfer-
received some play at oral argument.4 Few have stood up for the
decision.
I rise to the challenge. Atlantic Marine was, in the main, rightly
decided. A restrictive forum-selection clause does not make a proper venue
improper. The reason, as I will explain, is that private agreements cannot
trump the law. More fundamentally, party preferences are subordinate to
legal directives. If those legal directives do not incorporate party choice,
then party choice is largely unenforceable in court, except through
recourse to a standard breach of contract action.5
The Court's decision implicitly, though inconsistently, endorses the
principle of party subordinance. However, that principle has far broader
implications than perhaps the Court recognized, both for venue and for
other doctrines, such as personal jurisdiction and jury trial waivers. The
principle also creates tension with the recent push for more
customization of litigation in a variety of litigation procedures, from
restrictions on relief sought to differing limitations periods. It seems
unlikely the Court meant to open such a can of worms.
This Article views Atlantic Marine and the future of party preference
through this lens. Part I analyzes the opinion and the alternatives
presented by its critics. Part II defends the opinion as (mostly) faithful to
the principle of party subordinance. Part III explores the wider
implications of adherence to the principle within and beyond venue
selection.
2. 134 S. Ct. 568 (2013).
3. id. at 575-
4. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 12-16, Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. 568 (No. 12-929) (reflecting
the Court's interest with the theory of Professor Stephen Sachs).
5. See Scott Dodson, Party Subordinance in Federal Litigation, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. I, 23-24
(2014).
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I. ATLANTIC MARINE AND ITS CRITICS
A. THE DECISION
Atlantic Marine Construction Co., a Virginia corporation with its
principal place of business in Virginia, contracted with the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers to build a child development center in the Western
District of Texas. Atlantic Marine then entered into a subcontract with J-
Crew Management, Inc., a Texas corporation.6 The subcontract specified
that all disputes between the parties "shall be litigated in the Circuit
Court for the City of Norfolk, Virginia, or the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Norfolk Division."7
A dispute arose, and J-Crew sued Atlantic Marine in the Western
District of Texas on diversity jurisdiction grounds.' Venue undeniably
was proper in the Western District of Texas under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2)
because the subcontract was entered into and performed in that district.9
Nevertheless, Atlantic Marine argued that the forum-selection provision
rendered the Western District of Texas wrong or improper and moved to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(3) and 28 U.S.C. § 14o6(a).' ° In the alternative,
Atlantic Marine sought to transfer the case to the Eastern District of
Virginia under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) for the convenience of the parties and
witnesses and in the interests of justice." The lower courts denied the
motions, and Atlantic Marine sought review in the Supreme Court."
The Court unanimously reversed. "Whether venue is 'wrong' or
'improper,"' the Court reasoned, "depends exclusively on whether the
court in which the case was brought satisfies the requirements of federal
venue laws, and those provisions say nothing about a forum-selection
clause."' 3 Noting that the proper-venue statute "shall govern.., all civil
actions," and noting that the statute specified only exceptions "provided
by law,"' 4 the Court concluded that "[w]hether the parties entered into a
contract containing a forum-selection clause has no bearing on whether a
case falls into one of the categories of cases listed in § 1391(b)."'" And, if
the case falls into one of those categories, "venue is proper; if it does not,
venue is improper.",'
6
6. Atd. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 575.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 576.
9. Id. at 576 n.I.
Io. Id. at 576.
ii. Id.
12. Id. at 576-77.
13. Id. at 577.
14. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 139(a)(i) (2oo6)).
15. Id. at 577.
x6. Id.
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The Court also reasoned that the structure of the venue statutes
"confirms that they alone define whether venue exists."' 7 In particular,
the Court noted that the statutes manifest an intent to afford proper
venue somewhere. 8 Yet, the Court surmised, a forum-selection provision
that specified a state or foreign court to the exclusion of all federal courts
could frustrate that intent.'9
Finally, the Court considered Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh
Corp.,"2 in which the Court indicated that a federal court could use
§ 1404(a) to enforce a forum-selection clause."' Acknowledging that
Stewart did not decide that § 1404(a) was the only way for a federal court
to enforce a forum-selection clause, Atlantic Marine nevertheless pointed
to dictum in Stewart that seemed to approve the denial of a motion to
dismiss for improper venue in that case.2" For all these reasons, the Court
in Atlantic Marine held that "a forum-selection clause does not render
venue in a court 'wrong' or 'improper' within the meaning of § I406(a) or
Rule 12(b)(3)."23
Instead, the Court held, the proper enforcement vehicle is venue
transfer under § 1404(a). 4 That venue provision allows transfer from one
proper venue to another proper (or consented) venue for the convenience
of the parties and witnesses and in the interests of justice.25
The Court then articulated the proper standard for a district court to
use when transferring under a forum-selection clause and § 1404(a):
"Only under extraordinary circumstances unrelated to the convenience
of the parties should a § 1404(a) motion [based on a valid forum-
selection clause] be denied. 26 Because the forum-selection clause
represents the parties' agreement about the most proper forum and the
parties' legitimate expectations about where the suit will be litigated, the
Court reasoned, a court considering a § 1404(a) transfer based on a
restrictive forum-selection clause must treat all private interests as
weighing in favor of transfer, and instead consider only whether the
I7. Id. at 578.
i8. Id.
19. Id. ("That would not comport with the statute's design, which contemplates that venue will
always exist in some federal court.").
20. 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
21. Ad. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 579 (citing Stewart, 487 U.S. at 32).
22. Id. (citing Stewart, 487 U.S. at 28 n.8).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012) ("For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of
justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have
been brought or to any district or division to which all parties have consented.").
26. At. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 581.
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plaintiff has met its burden of showing that public interest factors defeat
transfer.
7
B. CRITICS AND THEIR ALTERNATIVES
The proper enforcement mechanism for forum-selection clauses has
been debated for some time. 8 The Second Circuit recently proclaimed
that it has, at various times, upheld enforcement via dismissal under Rule
12(b)(I) (for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction), Rule 12(b)(3) (for
improper venue), and Rule 12(b)(6) (for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted)."
Of these, Rule 12(b)(3) seems the most promising. The idea is
simply that a restrictive forum-selection clause makes an otherwise proper
venue "improper" under Rule 12(b)(3), or "wrong" under 28 U.S.C.
§ 14o6(a). Atlantic Marine urged this argument,30 and it had several
circuits on its side, including the Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth,
Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits.3' Further, after the Court issued its opinion,
several academic luminaries questioned why the Court did not decide the
case under Rule 12(b)(3) or § I4o6(a).32
Alternatively, a few circuits have employed dismissal under Rule
12(b)(6) to enforce a restrictive forum-selection clause.3 Professor Stephen
Sachs championed this argument in an important amicus brief filed in the
27. Id. at 582 n.6. Interestingly, the Court also stated that the transferee court should apply its own
choice-of-law rules when receiving a case transferred under a forum-selection clause. Id. at 582-83.
28. See generally Marcus, supra note I.
29. TradeComet.com LLC v. Google, Inc., 647 F.3d 472, 478-79 (2d Cir. 2011).
3o. AI. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 577.
31. See, e.g., Estate of Myhra v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 695 F.3d 1233, 1238 (iith Cir.
2012); Doe I v. AOL LLC, 552 F.3 d 1077, io8i (9th Cir. 2oo9); Martin v. Ball, 326 F. App'x. 191 (4th
Cir. 2009); Auto. Mechanics Local 701 Welfare & Pension Funds v. Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc.,
502 F.3d 740 (7th Cir. 2007); Commerce Consultants Int'l, Inc. v. Vetrerie Riunite, S.p.A., 867 F.2d 697
(D.C. Cir. 1989); see also 14D WIGrr ET AL., supra note I, § 3803.1 (citing cases).
32. See Allan Ides & Simona Grossi, Supreme Court Update, CIv. PROC. SEC. NEWSL. (Ass'n of
Am. Law Schs.), Fall 2013, at 5 (questioning the Court's use of § 1404 and rejection of § 1406); Posting
of Simona Grossi, simona.grossi@lls.edu, to civ-pro@listserv.nd.edu (Dec. 5, 2013) (on file with
author) ("I agree with Professor Clermont that the better solution would have been to use § 14o6.
Assuming the validity and enforceability of an exclusive [forum-selection clause], venues other than
the selected one should be treated as wrong venues."); cf. Posting of Linda Silberman,
linda.silberman@nyu.edu, to civ-pro@listserv.nd.edu (Dec. 3, 2013) (on file with author) ("I was
somewhat surprised the Court did not address the problem through 14o6. I realize that the Court says
venue is proper in the case, but given a choice of forum clause one might think such a clause divests the
'wrong' forum of personal jurisdiction."). But see Brief of Professor Stephen E. Sachs as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Neither Party at 2, Al. Marine, 134 S. Ct. 568 (No. 12-929) [hereinafter "Sachs Brief"]
("Forum-selection clauses have no effect on venue, which is defined by statute. While parties can waive
their venue objections in advance, they cannot destroy proper venue by private agreement.").
33. TradeComet.com, 647 F.3d at 478-79; Rivera v. Centro Medico de Turabo, Inc., 575 F.3 d io,
15 (Ist Cir. 2009); see also 14D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 1, § 3829 n.I7 (citing cases from the First and
Third Circuits).
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case. 4 In its opinion, the Court briefly noted the argument, but, because
neither party moved under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court declined to decide
whether Rule 12(b)(6) was a proper vehicle for enforcing a restrictive
forum-selection clause."
II. DEFENDING THE COURT
In this Part, I defend the Court's decision as faithful to the principle
of party subordinance.
A. PARTY SUBORDINANCE
One can visualize in various hierarchical ways the struggle among
parties, courts, and the law to control the litigation. One vision might put
parties on top, with the law and courts subject to their whims, as Figure i
shows.
FIGURE I: PARTY DOMINANCE
Partics
Under this vision, parties control both the law and the courts. Thus,
if parties wish to prescribe their own limitations period, they can do so by
private contract, and, if enforceable, their agreement will supersede the
law. And, because the law dominates over courts, the parties' privately
agreed limitations period-now with force of law-binds the courts.
Further, parties can exercise control over courts directly by waiving or
forfeiting claims, defenses, facts, arguments, or other issues, and courts
have no power to override those party choices.
The absolute and rigid version of Figure I is untenable under
current doctrine because settled exceptions, such as that of federal
subject matter jurisdiction, inherent powers, and the like, prevent parties
34. See generally Sachs Brief, supra note 32.
35. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 580.
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from exercising unfettered control. But the principle that it represents-a
principle of party dominance and control-is common even in a less
absolutist form. Federal courts routinely "enforce" both ex ante
agreements altering otherwise applicable law and ex post litigation
conduct such as waiver and forfeiture.
36
Indeed, before Atlantic Marine, most federal courts enforced
restrictive forum-selection clauses under Figure i's model. They
reasoned that a restrictive forum-selection clause effectively rendered
otherwise proper venues improper.37 Those courts thus enforced the clause
via a motion to dismiss for improper venue (or sometimes for failure to
state a claim). 8
Figure i's model of party dominance is not the only model for
organizing these relationships. 39 Figure 2 below presents a rotated vision
based upon a principle of party subordinance:
FIGURE 2" PARTY SUBORDINANCE
Law
Under this model, parties are beholden both to the law and to
courts. Parties (and courts) may not do what the law forbids, and their
attempts to alter the law are void. Further, parties cannot control courts;
courts are free to disregard party choices such as waiver, forfeiture, and
consent, as long as that discretion is not cabined by law.
Elsewhere, I have defended Figure 2's model as required to
preserve the public nature of the federal civil litigation system and in the
36. Dodson, supra note 5, at 20, 36-37, 40, 54.
37. See Marcus, supra note I, at 987 ("A contractually valid clause can displace [venue rules] as
defaults around which parties can bargain.").
38. 5 B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1352 nn.4-5 (3 d ed.
2004) (citing cases).
39. Professor David Marcus has articulated a model that appears to put courts on top. He
believes courts have discretion to enforce procedural contracts, and that judicial discretion is informed
by the presence of "extraindividual" interests. See Marcus, supra note I, at 1o42-43.
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governmental nature of the federal judiciary.' Federal courts offer a
neutral, formal, governmental adjudicative system, subsidized by taxes,
constrained by public law, and offering public goods." Accordingly,
federal courts are subject to the legal system as established by a
republican society, not to the whims of individual parties." If parties wish
to litigate differently, they are free to choose private forms of dispute
resolution that reflect the organization of Figure i and present no
governmental problem of private customization.
The model of party subordinance in Figure 2 has an additional
advantage over the model of party dominance illustrated in Figure i: the
model of party subordinance is absolute and free from exceptions. It is
true that, in rare instances, parties can exercise choices such as waiver,
forfeiture, consent, stipulation, and agreement, and those choices do bind
courts. Venue law, for example, allows parties to consent to a particular
venue, and the law then denies judges the authority to decline transfer to
that consented venue solely on the ground that the consented venue is
improper.43 But those instances are not exceptions requiring reversal of
the arrow pointing from courts to parties. The reason is that, in those
instances, party choice becomes law. Party choice cannot control courts
unilaterally. But if the law incorporates party choice, then courts must
follow it because of the arrow pointing from law to courts. The law is
supreme: If it wishes, it can elevate party choice to the status of law,
which then will control courts.
The Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") is a good example of
incorporation. That statute "expressly subordinates judicial power to
party agreements to arbitrate."' Further, the FAA provides a specific
mechanism for judicial enforcement of valid arbitration agreements.4"
The FAA is consistent with Figure 2 because law's position of dominance
permits the FAA to enable party agreement to control the courts. This
feature of the FAA is a rarity, however; most party agreements and
contractual provisions lack such legal sanction.
It is also true that parties purport to control courts with their choices
even absent legal incorporation. In other words, even when the law does
not essentially elevate party choice to the status of law, the law may
allow party choice. And courts generally defer to those choices. But
those choices do not bind courts. They are lawful choices (in other words,
they do not offend the arrow pointing from law to parties), but they do
40. Dodson, supra note 5, at 13.
41. Id. at 13-14.
42. Id. at 14 n.52.
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012) (stating that transfer may be "to any district or division to which all
parties have consented").
44. Dodson, supra note 5, at 17-18.
45. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2015).
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not affect the arrow pointing from courts to parties. Rather, courts have
discretion whether to defer to such party choices. For example, a
defendant can forfeit a limitations defense by failing or refusing to move
for dismissal or judgment on that basis. That forfeiture may disable the
defendant from raising the issue later, but it generally does not disable
the court from raising the issue. To the contrary, courts retain full
discretion, consistent with statute, to raise waived or forfeited issues and
even dispose of cases on their grounds.45 Of course, the wise court may
defer to party choice and not raise such issues, but that deference is
simply by the grace of the court and not because party choice disables it.47
B. THE COURT'S REASONING
The Supreme Court's opinion in Atlantic Marine follows the
Figure 2 mold, for the most part. It rejects the Figure I idea that the
parties can change the law of venue by private agreement to make an
otherwise proper venue improper, and instead it adopts the Figure 2 idea
that the law controls the parties' venue preferences."
Further, the opinion accepts the Figure 2 premise that the law could
incorporate party choice. It engages a rather elaborate statutory analysis
of whether venue law incorporates restrictive forum-selection clauses49
and ultimately concludes that venue law does incorporate, in a way, party
preferences. 0 Venue law does so through 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), which
allows venue transfer for convenience and in the interests of justice,
factors that are informed by private forum-selection clauses.5
Atlantic Marine, therefore, is a small triumph for the party-
subordinance model illustrated in Figure 2. But several parts of the
opinion suggest that the Court is wary about wholesale adoption of the
principle. For example, the opinion does not rely on first principles to
generate a general theory of party subordinance and then deductively
reason that it applies to venue law. Instead, the opinion focuses on the
particular statutory language of venue law in a way that could be
interpreted as confining its analysis to venue law alone.
Additionally, the Court's incorporation of restrictive forum-selection
clauses as an automatic proxy for the "convenience of the parties and
46. Dodson, supra note 5, at 29-30.
47. Id. at 30.
48. AtI. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 577 (2013) ("Whether venue is
'wrong' or 'improper' depends exclusively on whether the court in which the case was brought satisfies
the requirements of federal venue laws...."); id. ("When venue is challenged, the court must
determine whether the case falls within one of the three categories set out in § 13 9 t(b). If it does,
venue is proper; if it does not, venue is improper .... Whether the parties entered into a contract
containing a forum-selection clause has no bearing .....
49. Id. at 577-79.
50. Id. at 579.
5i. Id.
[Vol. 66:675
FUTURE OF PARTY PREFERENCE
witnesses" test of § 1404(a) 2 seems so stretched as to approach the party-
dominance model of Figure I. Unlike the express incorporation of party
agreements elsewhere in § 1404(a) and § 1404(b),53 the "convenience of
the parties" language does not obviously incorporate party agreement or
consent. Further, one can easily imagine a host of scenarios in which the
conveniences of the parties are not accurately reflected by a particular
agreement, especially if the agreement is a bargained-for sacrifice by one
party in exchange for other terms. Even if an agreement did accurately
reflect the conveniences of the parties at one time, it may not by the time
a lawsuit commences. It is in the nature of a modern transient society
that people move and circumstances change. The most that can be said
about the "convenience of the parties" language is that it allows forum-
selection clauses to be probative of the parties' conveniences. The Court's
more reaching interpretation of the statutory language to mean dispositive
evidence is so tenuous that it risks displacing the statutory test with the
parties' agreement in a way consonant with Figure i."
Finally, the Court's position that the transferee court receiving a
case transferred under § 1404(a) via a forum-selection clause should
apply choice-of-law rules as if no transfer occurred is identical to a § 14o6
transfer.5 Although, most plausibly, this holding is simply a product of the
Supreme Court's federal common law power to craft nonconstitutional
choice-of-law rules for the federal courts, it is also consistent with the
idea that a transfer based on a forum-selection clause falls under § 406.
Thus, it remains to be seen whether Atlantic Marine presages
broader adoption of the principle of party subordinance or whether
Atlantic Marine means to create yet another kind of exception to a model
of party dominance.
C. A NOTE ABOUT RULE 12(b)(6)
The Court ducked Professor Sachs' question of whether a forum-
selection clause could be enforced under Rule 12(b)(6) (or Rule 12(c) or
Rule 56). 6 But it is worth considering in light of the model of party
subordinance.
The model of party subordinance positions the law at the apex.
Accordingly, if the substantive law of the claim treats a forum-selection
52. Id. at 581 ("Only under extraordinary circumstances unrelated to the convenience of the
parties should a § 1404(a) motion [based on a valid forum-selection clause] be denied.").
53. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(b) (2012) ("Upon motion, consent or stipulation of all parties, any
action, suit or proceeding of a civil nature or any motion or hearing thereof, may be transferred, in the
discretion of the court, from the division in which pending to any other division in the same district.").
54. I am grateful to Ingrid Wuerth for pushing me on these points.
55. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. My thanks to Rocky Rhodes for voicing this point.
56. Ad. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 58o.
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clause as extinguishing the claim outside of the designated court, s7 then
the forum-selection clause becomes substantive law and could be
enforceable under merits motions made under Rule 12(b)(6), Rule 12(c),
Rule 56, and the like. Importantly, the "waiver," "release," or "defense"
that arises from the forum-selection clause would have to be created by
the substantive law rather than by the forum-selection clause. In other
words, the substantive law would have to allow the parties to fashion
such forum-based limitations on the claim. Substantive liability restrictions
are not unusual; time-limitations periods, for example, are ubiquitous.
But nonjurisdictional, forum-based limitations are rare and would create
tension with Supreme Court precedent in some odd ways.f Nevertheless,
nonjurisdictional, forum-based limitations on the substantive law could
exist59 and would control if not preempted or otherwise unlawful.
The substantive claim at issue in Atlantic Marine, however, does not
appear to specifically incorporate the effects of a private forum-selection
clause. Accordingly, the merits-based mechanisms noted by the Court
were not viable alternatives in practice, and therefore the Court was right
to eschew them without a clearer indication of incorporation.
III. IMPLICATIONS
This Part considers the implications of Atlantic Marine and the
principle of party subordinance for venue and beyond.
A. FOR VENUE
If Atlantic Marine represents endorsement of the principle of party
subordinance of Figure 2 for restrictive forum-selection clauses, then it
should affect the enforcement of permissive forum-selection clauses as
well. If, for example, restrictive forum-selection clauses do not change
venue law unless the law incorporates the clause, then permissive forum-
selection clauses also do not change venue law unless the law incorporates
57. Sachs Brief, supra note 32, at 2 ("If the clause is valid and enforceable, it waives the plaintiff's
right to sue in an excluded forum, offering the defendant an affirmative defense to liability in that
forum and the right to have the suit dismissed [under 12(b)(6), 12(c), or 56]."). But see Marcus, supra
note i, at 1033 ("Procedural mechanisms like Rule 12(b) were not designed as tools for enforcement
of contracts for procedure.").
58. For example, Atlantic Marine was clear that the doctrine of forum non conveniens could be
used to enforce a forum-selection clause that specified only nonfederal forums. See Atd. Marine, 134
S. Ct. at 580. Yet the Court has held the doctrine of forum non conveniens to be purely procedural and
not merits based. See id. (citing Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malaysia Int'l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 432
(2007)). If forum non conveniens and venue transfer are non-merits based, then they fit uncomfortably
within a Rule i2(b)(6) dismissal, to say nothing of a Rule 12(c) or Rule 56 judgment.
59. In some ways, the Federal Arbitration Act is a useful analogue. See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2o15)
(creating a specific procedure for enforcing valid arbitration agreements). For a different context, see
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393 (2oio) (recognizing that a class
action bar could apply in state court even if it could not apply in federal court).
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the clause. Section 1391 no more allows parties to privately broaden the
scope of proper venue than it allows parties to privately narrow the
scope. 6 Thus, permissive forum-selection clauses are just as ineffective as
restrictive forum-selection clauses.
It is true that the procedural law permits parties to waive or forfeit
their venue objections. But the law affords parties this choice through the
specific mechanism of Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule I2(b)(3) gives parties the right to challenge improper venue, but
that right must be exercised by timely motion.6 Accordingly, defendants
may waive or forfeit objections to improper venue by failing to raise
those objections in a timely motion under Rule 12(b)(3).
But neither a Federal Rule nor § 1391 says anything about ex ante
waiver of venue objections through a permissive forum-selection clause. 62
Consequently, a permissive forum-selection agreement is merely a private
contract by the parties, in which each party promises to waive objections
to that venue using the ex post mechanism established by Rule 12.
Failure to abide by that promise may give rise to a breach of contract
claim under state law, but it does not somehow make the improper venue
proper or deprive the defendant's ability to file a meritorious Rule
12(b)(3) motion for improper venue. Indeed, outside of a separate
breach of contract action seeking the remedy of specific performance,
such an ex ante agreement is unenforceable by a federal court.
Of course, commitment to the principle of law's dominance reflected
in Figure 2 means that the law could allow parties to waive their venue
objections in advance. But aside from § 1404(a), which allows transfer to
an otherwise improper venue that has been consented to by the parties,
no codified law appears to allow ex ante waiver. Perhaps some federal
common law principle extends to permissive forum-selection clauses, but
that would be a complicated analysis indeed, particularly for diversity
cases like Atlantic Marine.6" Commitment to the principle of party
subordinance, then, should demand skepticism of the facile assertion that
parties can waive venue objections in advance.6 4
6o. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (2012).
61. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(3).
62. Indeed, surely all would agree that a permissive forum-selection clause does not waive all
right to challenge improper venue under Rule 12(b)( 3 ), such as if the case is filed in a venue allowed
by neither private agreement nor § 1391.
63. Federal common law is more prevalent and justified in admiralty, where forum-selection
clauses have taken hold. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991); The Bremen v.
Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972). It is therefore quite disturbing that a number of courts have
extended admiralty doctrine's treatment of forum-selection clauses to the diversity context. See
14D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note i, § 3803.J n.14 (citing cases).
64. For such an assertion, see Sachs Brief, supra note 32, at 2; N.W. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Donovan,
916 F.2d 372, 3 (7 th Cir. 199o) (Posner, J.) ("[S]ince a defendant is deemed to waive (that is, he
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B. AND BEYOND
There seems little reason to restrict the principle of party subordinance
to venue. If Atlantic Marine subordinates parties' venue preferences to
codified venue law, then Atlantic Marine supports the subordination of
other party preferences as well. Parties today purport to exert domineering
private choice in a variety of contexts, including jury waiver, personal
jurisdiction, choice of law, limitations deadlines, class-action waivers, and
discovery. Atlantic Marine properly calls all of these into question.
How might party subordination work in these areas? This article will
tackle just one that is useful for illustrative purposes: limitations periods."
Say two commercial entities enter into a contract that specifies that
any lawsuit between them shall be filed no more than four years after the
claim accrues. A dispute occurs and gives rise to a claim. Under the law,
the limitations period of the claim is two years. Say the plaintiff then files
suit on the claim three years after the claim accrues. The timeline looks
like this:
I 2 3 4
Claim Claim Suit Contract
Accrues SOL Filed SOL
The defendant moves to dismiss (or for judgment on) the claim based
on the expiration of the legal limitations period. The plaintiff opposes the
motion on the ground that the lawsuit was timely under the contract.
What result?
Under a model of party subordinance consistent with Atlantic Marine,
the court must grant the motion because the plaintiff's suit is untimely
under the law. The contract neither alters the legal limitations period nor
binds the court -assuming, of course, that the underlying limitations law
does not itself incorporate party modifications. It is as if Box 4 above
does not exist (at least in the eyes of the law and the court). The court
has no discretion here; it must dismiss because the only legal authority
(Box 2) demands it.
Now, a wrinkle: say the defendant fails to move to dismiss (or for
judgment) on limitations grounds. During discovery, the court realizes
that a limitations issue exists. Can the court enter judgment against the
plaintiff sua sponte?
forfeits) objections to personal jurisdiction or venue simply by not making them in timely fashion, a
potential defendant can waive such objections in advance of suit by signing a forum selection clause.").
65. For a discussion of the others, see Dodson, supra note 5, at 36-38.
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Under the theory of party subordinance, the answer is that the court
has the power to enter judgment but is unlikely to do so. This answer has
three steps. The first is that, as stated above, the lawsuit is legally
untimely because the contract does not change the law. The second step,
illustrated in Figure 2, is that just as the parties' ex ante contract does not
alter the limitations period, neither does the defendant's failure to raise
it. The defendant may have disabled itself from raising the issue as a
procedural matter, but the defendant's conduct does not affect the court
(unless the law somehow empowers such conduct to bind the court).
Thus, despite the defendant's ex post failure to raise the issue, the court
continues to have the power to recognize and enforce the time
limitations set forth by law.
The third step, however, is whether the court should do so. Here is
where Box 4 suddenly matters: Box 4 ought to influence the exercise of
the court's discretion to raise an issue forfeited by the parties. Although
the court has the power to ignore the defendant's ex post failure to raise
the limitations issue, the court should consider that the defendant's ex
post conduct is consistent with the ex ante commitments of both parties.
Clearly, both parties believe and wish the lawsuit to be considered
timely. In a typical commercial dispute involving primarily private
interests, it is unlikely that the court could find justification to override
such party preferences. To be clear, the court could override those
preferences, but sound discretion would counsel against it.
Now change the hypothetical such that the law provides for a four-
year limitations period but the contract provides for a two-year
limitations period. Switching Boxes 2 and 4, the timeline now looks like
this:
I 2 3 4
Claim Contract Suit Claim
Accrues SOL. Filed SOL
The defendant moves to dismiss (or for judgment on) the claim
based on the expiration of the contractual limitations period. The plaintiff
opposes the motion on the ground that the lawsuit was timely under the
law. What result?
Of course, the law controls. The contract does not shorten the legal
limitations period. It is as if Box 2 does not exist. Therefore, the law is
timely and the motion must be denied. The court has no discretion to do
otherwise.
What if the defendant fails to move? Here, the answer is that the
court may not dismiss (or enter judgment) on limitations grounds. The
court has discretion to raise a limitations issue that a defendant waives or
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forfeits, but consideration of the issue has a clear and definitive answer.
Unlike in the first hypothetical, here the claim is timely under the law,
and so the motion must be denied. Box 2 is truly irrelevant to the
litigation.
It is worth emphasizing, however, that the contract is not irrelevant
as to the parties. Parties can enter into contracts that carry penalties for
breach under standard breach of contract actions. Box 2 may be irrelevant
to this litigation, but it would be highly relevant to a subsequent breach
of contract action that the defendant may file against the plaintiff. The
plaintiff has breached the contract by filing a lawsuit at a time prohibited
by her agreement. She therefore could be liable to the defendant in a
separate breach of contract action.
C. COMMERCIAL EFFECTS
I acknowledge the serious normative and practical implications of
pervasive party subordinance. Party subordinance drastically reduces the
power of parties to customize and control their litigation. They cannot
change the law, and even when the law allows them to make choices,
courts retain the power to override or disregard those choices. This
disempowerment disrupts the certainty and predictability that may
facilitate commercial arrangements, erodes litigant autonomy, burdens
courts with issues the parties would prefer not to litigate for cost or
strategic reasons, and risks siphoning cases into arbitration and out of the
public courts entirely.66
However compelling, these concerns are the faults of a rigidly
independent public legal system that benefits from them in other,
significant ways.67 Further, these concerns can be mitigated on their own
terms. Congress and rulemakers can change the law to empower party
choice and give parties control over courts, as with the FAA. For lawful
ex post choices, the practical effects of judicial override may be so
normatively distasteful as to be dispositive in the exercise of judicial
discretion to defer to those choices. As an additional safeguard, party
agreements are enforceable through breach-of-contract actions, which
parties can bolster through liquidated damages clauses or indemnification
provisions. Finally, if the risks of the public system prove too great,
parties can always opt for a private adjudication system that allows for
greater control and customization. These mitigations are not panaceas,
but they ought to be ameliorative.
66. Id. at 43-46.
67. See id. at 13-15 (describing the public benefits of court autonomy and independence).
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CONCLUSION
I do not pretend that the Court considered all of these implications
in Atlantic Marine. Far more likely, the Court was focused on the
particular statutory regime of venue. As I have indicated, that statutory
regime offers a way to limit Atlantic Marine to the venue context, and
perhaps the Court will, in later cases, so confine Atlantic Marine.
But the better view, in my judgment, would allow the principle of
party subordinance in Atlantic Marine to broaden beyond venue.
Figure 2 is simple, internally consistent, and protective of public court
values, while still allowing room for accommodation of private values.
The main difference between Figure i and Figure 2 is that Figure 2
lodges the authority for those accommodations in the public actors-the
law and the courts-rather than the parties. But that, I believe, is the way
it should be in the public courts.
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